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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

NATlJRE OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from a conviction of the charge of :\1alicious Injury to Property. Mr.
Osterhoudt asks this Court to reverse the Judgment of Conviction in the Magistrate Court.
II.

STATEMENT Of' FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

On June 17, 2011, Officer Ruben Murillo investigated a complaint of Malicious Injury to
Property. The reporting party was Jessica Adams. That evening, Ms. Adams (the administrator
of the poker league that was operating at the bar that night), Mr. Osterhoudt, Shae Lamp, and
about 30 other patrons were playing poker outside on the deck at the 360 Bistro Restaurant in
Twin Falls, ID. Mr. Osterhoudt and Mr. Lamp were intoxicated and acting obnoxiously. 1 At
some point Mr. Osterhoudt and Mr. Lamp left the table and went to the bathroom, taking their
poker chips with them.
Mr. Osterhoudt placed his chips on a shelf or a wall outside the bathroom. Ms. Adams
followed him and confronted him about taking his chips from the table. He told her that he was
finished playing. As she was walking away, Mr. Osterhoudt called her a derogatory name.2 At
trial Ms. Adams confinned that in her statements to police, Ms. Adams wrote that she left Mr.
Lamp and Mr. Osterhoudt inside and she exited to the deck to avoid confrontation. 3 At trial, Ms.
Adams testified that Mr. Lamp came with her outside and he exited first, in contradiction of her
earlier VvTitten statements. She then testified that while she was still inside she heard banging

1

Transcript, Page 50, Lines 11-20.
State's Exhibit B.
3
96, Line 12 - Page 97, Line 8.
State's Exhibit B; Transcript,
2

4

coming from the back of the building. 4 She confirmed on cross-examination that she told the
officer that she reentered the building and found Mr. Lamp and a broken back door to the
restaurant. She asked Mr. Lamp what had happened and inquired who was responsible for the
door. 5 In her trial testimony she testified that she went to the back door, saw that it was broken
and then went back outside to ask Mr. Lamp those questions 6, which differed from her testimony
on cross-examination.
Ms. Adams confirmed on cross-examination that when Officer Murillo arrived, she told
him that she had been outside, that both Mr. Lamp and Mr. Osterhoudt had been inside, and that
Ed's mom had heard a banging noise. She told him that Mr. Lamp had offered to pay for the
door. She told him that Mr. Lamp left when she decided to contact the police. 7
The same evening after leaving the 360 Bistro Restaurant, Mr. Osterhoudt was charged
with both a felony and a misdemeanor in two subsequent events. During the last event, Mr.
Osterhoudt was beaten by a police officer and arrested for resisting arrest. Officer Murillo then
arrived and questioned Mr. Osterhoudt. Officer Murillo recorded this conversation. He did not
issue Miranda warnings to Mr. Osterhoudt.
On November 15, 2011, the court issued a Pretrial and Trial Order. On November 22,
2011, the court denied a Motion to Continue from Mr. Osterhoudt at a second pretrial
conference. On November 28, 2011, the State disclosed via e-mail the photograph that
eventually became State's Exhibit A. Mr. Osterhoudt's attorney also filed a Motion in Limine.
On November 30, 2011, the Motion in Limine was heard and the trial commenced and

4

Transcript, Page 51, Lines 10-20.
State's Exhibit B; Transcript, Page 98, Lines 1-3.
6
Transcript, Page 53, Line 24 - Page 54, Line 3.
7
Transcript, Page 68, Lines 4-14.

5

5

concluded. Mr. Lamp presented himself as a witness during the lunch recess of the trial. 8 On
December 20, 2011, Mr. Osterhoudt was sentenced.
Mr. Osterhoudt timely appealed his conviction to the District Court. District Judge
Randy Stoker denied the appeal and a Memorandum Opinion on Appeal was filed on May 4,
2012. Mr. Osterhoudt timely appealed the District Court opinion.
III.

Summary of the Argument

There were numerous evidentiary and procedural errors that occurred before the jury was
sworn on November 30, 2011. These errors and others resulted in Mr. Osterhoudt being forced
to trial without a chance to call witnesses that could have helped his defense. The evidence
presented at Jury Trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Franklin
Osterhoudt committed Malicious Injury to Property and he should have been found not guilty on
this charge.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

THE JUDGE ERRED IN ALLOWING THE STATE TO PRESENT 404(B) EVIDENCE
IN ITS CASE-IN-CHIEF
THE THREAT OF A MISTRIAL COERCED MR. OSTERHOUDT TO REJECT
PURSUING A THEORY OF THE CASE THAT 11\CLUDED A NEW \\t1TNESS AND
NEW THEORY OF EX CULPA TORY EVIDENCE
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE MAGISTRATE
COURT'S JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION

8

Transcript, Page 76, Line 20 ~ Page 81, Line 20.
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ARGUMENT

The Jury convicted Mr. Osterhoudt (1) without being able to consider all exculpatory
evidence because he was not allowed to call witnesses to rebut the State's 404(b) evidence, and
(2) because he was coerced to proceed with trial despite the presence of an exculpatory witness,
and also (3) without any sufficient factual basis for finding him guilty of every element of the
statutory crime.
In State v. Holder, l 00 Idaho 129, 131 (1979), the Idaho Supreme Court articulated the
proper analysis for an appellate court to evaluate a criminal conviction, which has become
known as the 'substantial evidence rule:' "[t]he test that should be used by a trial court is
whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction of the offense or offenses charged."
Emphasis added. The Holder court only tempered this standard with the instruction that "[t]he
credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony are matters for the jury,
not the court" and so the presented evidence should be considered in the light most favorable to
the prosecution: as if the State's witnesses were all completely credible. Id. Internal citations
omitted. The Holder court specifically found that the trial judge had been incorrect when he
ruled that "where there is evidence, although slight or whatever it might be, that it was for the
jury to make the final determination." Id. at 130-31. Instead, the evidence must be substantial
enough to actually support the charge. The trial judge, in this way, guards against "the risk that a
jury may capriciously find [a defendant] guilty though there is no legally sufficient evidence of
his guilt." Id. at 130 (quoting 2 Wright Federal Practice & Procedure§ 461 (1969) at 243.)
In another case, State v. Higgins, 103 Idaho 422, 426 (1982), the Idaho Court of Appeals
noted that Holder seemed to be at odds with some language of State v. Vargas, 100 Idaho 658,
659 (1979), which directed that motions of acquittal "must be granted only when there is no
7

evidence upon which to base a verdict of guilt. .. involving a total lack of inculpatory evidence."
The Higgins court noted, however, that even the Vargas court detailed "abundant, competent,
and substantial evidence in the record to support a conviction of the offenses charged" and
concluded that Vargas was not at odds with Holder's substantial evidence rule. State v. Higgins
at 426. More, the Higgins court went on to detail the test for deciding this type of motion under
l.C.R. 29:
The trial judge must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the state,
recognizing that full consideration must be given to the right of the jury to
determine the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be afforded evidence, as well
as the right to draw all justifiable inferences from the evidence. Viewed in this
manner, where the inculpatory evidence presented as to any essential element of
the crime is so insubstantial that jurors could not help but have a reasonable doubt
as to the proof of that element, a judgment of acquittal should be entered.

Id. at 427.
I.

THE JUDGE ERRED IN ALLOWING THE STATE TO PRESENT 404(B) EVIDENCE IN ITS
CASE-IN-CHIEF

a.

The State did not comply with the judicial order or the criminal rules
governing the admission of 404(b) evidence

Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) states:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person
acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that the prosecution in a
criminal case shall file and serve notice reasonably in advance of trial, or during
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general
nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
Judge Kershaw's Pretrial and Trial Order states that "if the State wishes to present evidence
under Rule 404(b), Idaho Rules of Evidence, the notice required by that rule shall be given to

8

opposing counsel at least five (5) days before the trial, unless good cause is shown why this
deadline was not reasonable." 9
The State never served notice of its intent 10 to introduce evidence of other bad acts on
Mr. Osterhoudt or his attorney. On the other hand, Mr. Osterhoudt's counsel filed a Motion in
Limine for the exclusion of such evidence two days before trial on November 28, 2011. As
pointed-out by the District Court in its Memorandum Opinion on Appeal, the State did elicit
evidence of Mr. Osterhoudt's state of mind.
The District Court found that the magistrate did not err in allowing the state to introduce
evidence of a state of mind, notwithstanding the fact that the State failed to comply with the
Pretrial and Trial Order. Mr. Osterhoudt's attorney specifically argued to the magistrate and
counsel that it could produce witnesses 11 to rebut the state's assertion that Mr. Osterhoudt's
conduct and behavior had nothing to do with any incident at the 360 Bistro Restaurant, but had to
do with his recent beating at the hands of law enforcement; however, he argued that he could not
produce those witnesses on such short notice. When Mr. Osterhoudt moved for the exclusion of
this evidence prior to trial, the magistrate denied the motion. When the issue was re-raised by
Mr. Osterhoudt's attorney before the trial began, the magistrate first communicated his
displeasure that the trial had not started and his impatience that the jury had been waiting for
some time 12, and then denied the motion a second time.

9

Pretrial and
Transcript,
11
Transcript,
12
Transcript,
10

Trial Order,
2, Paragraph 6.
Page 8, Lines 5-7.
Page 8, LinelO
9, Line 15; Page 16, Line4-Page20, Line 15.
Page 16, Lines 4-7.
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b.

The admission of that evidence constitutes reversible error

Mr. Osterhoudt was charged and convicted under Idaho Code Section 18-7001 (1 ). That section
states that
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section, every person who
maliciously injures or destroys any real or personal property not his own, or any
jointly owned property without permission of the joint owner, or any property
belonging to the community of the person's marriage, in cases otherwise than such
as are specified in this code, is guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punishable
by imprisonment in the county jail for up to one (1) year or a fine of not more
than one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both.
The magistrate ruled in the defendant's Motion in Limine that the State was allowed, in its casein-chief, to present evidence of Mr. Osterhoudt's alcohol use, his un-Mirandized statements
made while under arrest, and proof of his demeanor after he had been beaten by a different police
officer in a separate case. Mr. Osterhoudt' s attorney specifically and affirmatively argued 13 to
the court that he was not prepared to proceed with trial if the court allowed the State to present
this evidence, as it precluded him from calling witnesses to rebut the 404(b) evidence. The trial
judge denied the defendant's motion on these issues and ordered the trial to commence. 14 The
State then introduced this evidence in its case-in-chief. 15 By not continuing the trial to allow Mr.
Osterhoudt to seek and call witnesses to rebut the State's 404(b) evidence, the court forced Mr.
Osterlioudt into the improper position of testifying 16 or allowing the state's evidence to go unrebutted.
Because the magistrate made his finding despite the State not complying with the Idaho
Rules of Evidence, despite the language of the judicial trial order, without a finding of good

13

14
15

16

Transcript,
Transcript,
Transcript,
Transcript,

Page
Page
Page
Page

11, Lines 8-25, Page 12, Lines 15-Page 13, Line 8.
14, Line 17.
50, Lines 11-20; Page 85, Lines 7-12.
14, Lines 9-14.
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cause as to procedure or substance, and over the written, filed, and argued objection of Mr.
Osterhoudt, the trial court committed reversible error and this appeal should be granted.
II.

THE THREAT OF A MISTRIAL COERCED MR. OSTERHOUDT TO REJECT PURSUING A
THEORY OF THE CASE THAT INCLUDED A NEW WITNESS AND NEW THEORY OF
EX CULP A TORY EVIDENCE

The Idaho Supreme Court recently found that a trial that is fraught with enors may
necessitate a reversal. "Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in
and of themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial." State v. Ellington, 151
Idaho 53, 72 (2011) (internal citations omitted).
A defendant has a Due Process right to a fair trial. In State v. Clay, 112 Idaho 261 (Ct.

App. 1987), the Court of Appeals found enor where a trial judge learned of a jury's deadlock
and ordered them to reach a resolution. The reasoning of the Court there is instructive to this
case: the "vast deference we give to jury verdicts can be justified only if the integrity of the jury
deliberation process is scrupulously maintained. Moreover, the constitutional guarantee of due
process demands that an accused receive a fair and impartial jury; this guaranty is violated if jury
deliberations are tainted by undue pressure." Id. at 263.
The Supreme Court ofldaho is offended when a trial judge uses his opinion or his
authority to encourage, pressure, or coerce a defendant to make any involw1tary decision. Booth
v. State, 151 Idaho 612 (2011). There, the Supreme Court found error where the sentencing

judge assured a defendant and his family that he would receive a ten year fixed sentence if he
pleaded guilty and a fixed life sentence if he took the case to trial.
During the lunch recess, Shae Lamp appeared in Mr. Osterhoudt's attorney's office
stating that he would like to testify and indicating that the State's witnesses had misrepresented

11

his comments and the facts. He offered an alternative theory of the case. Neither counsel had
contact information for Mr. Lamp prior to that moment.
The issue was briefly discussed in chambers and then argued on the record. Mr.
Wonderlich argued against Mr. Lamp testifying and Mr. Austin supported Mr. Osterhoudt's right
to call Mr. Lamp as a witness whose testimony might prove exculpatory. The magistrate
determined that Mr. Lamp would be allowed to testify, 17 but granted the State a chance to
interview Mr. Lamp.
After speaking with Mr. Lamp, Mr. Wonderlich asked the Judge to declare a mistrial.

18

He argued that he was not prepared to rebut the evidence that Mr. Lamp would offer. Mr.
Osterhoudt's attorney had made the exact same argument regarding 404(b) evidence during the
Motion in Limine that morning before the trial.
The trial judge then turned to Mr. Austin and expressed his displeasure with the turn of
events. He indicated that the court had rescheduled five other jury trials in order to
accommodate Mr. Osterhoudt. Mr. Osterhoudt and his attorney were aware that the Pretrial and
Trial Order advises that:
Should a jury be called to try this case, and should either the State dismiss this
case on the morning of trial or the Defendant plead guilty on the morning of trial,
then the parties are advised that the Court may assess the costs of that jury against
the offending party.
Defendant's counsel shall send a copy of this Order to the Defendant.

19

In one brief moment, Mr. Osterhoudt was faced with the decision of incurring the wrath of the
court (which had already manifested its impatience with the slow start to the trial and the burden

17
18
19

Transcript, Page 79, Lines 9-16.
Transcript, Page 80, Line 19- Page 81, Line 2.
Pretrial and Trial Order, Page 3.
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on the jurors of having to wait), supporting the mistrial motion and spending at least an
additional 21 days in jail awaiting another trial date, 20 or choosing not to call a witness that was
proposing to offer exculpatory evidence on his behalf. Any objective defendant in Mr.
Osterhoudt's position could only have felt he was being coerced into continuing the trial. Mr.
Osterhoudt felt that every significant legal ruling had gone against him up until this point in the
trial.
Judge Kershaw's Pretrial and Trial Order describes what the State must do in order to
introduce 404(6) evidence. Though the State did not comply with that Order, the magistrate
allowed the State to use that evidence. The Order similarly states that all discovery must be
completed by the time of the second pretrial conference and that all exhibits must be exchanged
before that date. 21 Nonetheless, when Mr. Osterhoudt's attorney objected to introduction of
State's Exhibit A, because it was only disclosed two days before trial, the objection was
ovenuled and the Exhibit was entered. 22 When Mr. Osterhoudt asked for a continuance at his
second pretrial conference on November 22, 2011, it was denied.
The rulings of the court, the demeanor and language of the judge, and language contained
in the Pretrial and Trial Order clearly indicated to Mr. Osterhoudt that the court would grant the
State's motion for a mistrial regarding Shae Lamp, and that Mr. Osterhoudt stood a good chance
of being assessed the costs of bringing in the jury on November 30, 2011, if he did not continue
with the trial.
As with the witnesses that he might have called to rebut the State's 404(6) evidence, Mr.
Osterhoudt was not given a meaningful, voluntary, or knowing opportunity to acquaint the jury

20

The earliest Mr. Osterhoudt could have another trial date, given the court's calendar.
Pretrial and Trial Order, Page 2, Paragraph 2.
22
Transcript, Page 70, Lines 12-22; Page 72, Lines 2-6.

21
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with his version of the facts or his theory of the case. A coerced choice is not a choice at all. It
was therefore error for the magistrate to pressure Mr. Osterhoudt into accepting a mistrial in
order to receive his due process right to have a fully-informed jury deliberate the facts and all the
proposed testimony.

III.

THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE MAGISTRATE COURT'S
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION

The Appellate Court should find that the evidence presented in the entirety of the hearing
was insufficient to support a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Ultimately, it is
contended that the verdict was unsupported by the requisite evidence. The Idaho Court of
Appeals detailed the standard to be used by a reviewing court in State v. Clifford, 130 Idaho 259,
263 (1997):
Our standard for the review of a judgment of conviction which allegedly is not
supported by the evidence is well settled. We will not overturn a verdict where
there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have
found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements
of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. On appeal, we will not substitute our view
for that of the factfinder as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be
given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
evidence. In addition, the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable
to the prosecution. (Internal citations omitted.)
Even viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the testimony
presented falls far short of producing "substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact
could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of [proof] ... beyond a reasonable
doubt." Id.

14

Ms. Adams's oral statements recorded by Officer Murillo 23 were perfectly consistent with
24

her written statement

given two days later. Both of her June statements were clear that she was

outside the building when the door was broken, that others

not she

heard the noise, 25 and that

Shae Lamp was present with Mr. Osterhoudt in the hallway when the door was broken. At trial
she gave testimony inconsistent with all of these assertions. She testified that she was still in the
building when the door was broken, that she heard the door being broken, and also that Shae
Lamp was walking in front of her outside on the deck and in her field of vision when the door
was broken. However, she also testified that she asked Shae Lamp what had happened to the
door and who had broken it. This last statement is internally inconsistent with her testimony that
Shae Lamp would have no better idea about what had happened than she, since - according to
her trial testimony - he also did not witness the door breaking. She also admitted that Shae Lamp
offered to pay for the broken door and fled the restaurant when Ms. Adams said she was going to
contact law enforcement to resolve the issue. 26
She was confronted with her prior inconsistent statements. She testified that she
remembered events better and more clearly during the November 30, 2011 trial than either
during her June 17, 2011 oral statements to Officer Murillo or in her June 18, 2011 written
witness statemcnt.

27

Though Idaho Rule of Evidence 6

allows a witness a chance to explain

prior inconsistent statements, an objectively reasonable observer is not obligated to accept the
most recent version of a witness's testimony over a version given previously. In this case, there
was substantial evidence presented to provide reasonable doubt that Shae Lamp, not Franklin

23

Defense's Exhibit 1.
State's Exhibit B.
25
Transcript, Page 89, Lines 7-10; Page 92, Lines 10-14; Page 96, Line 12
26
Transcript, Page 68, Lines 4- I 6.
Transcript, Page 61 . Line 22 - Page 62, Line 2.
24
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Page 97, Line 8.

Osterhoudt, committed·this crime. As such, this court must find that Ms. Adams's testimony
docs not provide substantial evidence to justify a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
In its Memorandum Opinion on Appeal, the District Court indicated that the defendant
"did not materially impeach any" testimony by the state's witnesses. 28 This is simply not true.
Mr. Osterhoudt's theory of the case is that Mr. Osterhoudt did not break the back door of the 360
Bistro Restaurant. Indeed, the cumulative information that Ms. Adams' provided law
enforcement on that date of incident, which she later confirmed at trial on cross-examination,
indicated a substantial likelihood that Shae Lamp was responsible for the broken door to the
restaurant. Mr. Osterhoudt's attorney cross-examined Ms. Adams thoroughly regarding
discrepancies between her trial testimony on direct examination and her written statements to
police on the night of the incident. Specifically, whether Shae Lamp was in a position to have
broken the door. Mr. Osterhoudt did materially impeach the testimony of Ms. Adams as best he
could.
lfMr. Osterhoudt did not impeach Officer Murillo's testimony as effectively as he might
have, through additional witnesses, it is because the Court denied his motions to exclude
untimely-disclosed evidence and did not allow him a meaningful opportunity or timeframe to
call witnesses to rebut the state's asse11ions. The force of this potential, though com1-prohibited,
testimony is especially apparent in the District Court's conclusion referencing (1) his use of
profanity and (2) his being exclusive individual who could have committed this crime as the sole
basis for finding substantial evidence to support the jury's findings.

28

Memorandum Opinion on Appeal, Page 6.
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It is extremely noteworthy that the two things that the District Court mentioned are

precisely the two things that the magistrate erred in allowing into the record. The District Court
found that "the evidence clearly supports a finding by the jury that Osterhoudt is the only person
who could have caused the damage. His demeanor and repeated expletives about the facility and
Ms. Adams corroborates the jury's finding that Osterhoudt committed the act as charged."
Because the bases for the District Court finding substantial evidence to corroborate the jury's
verdict were based illegal evidence, this Court should overturn Mr. Osterhoudt's conviction as
not being supported by sufficient evidence.

CONCLUSION

Franklin Scott Osterhoudt respectfully requests that the Appellate Court find ( 1) that it
was error to allow the State to introduce its 404(b) evidence in its case-in-chief, (2) that it was
error for the trial court to coerce Mr. Osterhoudt into foregoing examination of a potentially
exculpatory witness, and (3) that there was insufficient evidence to support the Jury's verdict.
Finally, Mr. Osterhoudt further requests that this Court reverse the decision of the
Magistrate Court, find fundamental error, and enter its judgment of acquittal, or dismiss the case.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

,USti
D7puty Pub~i~ Defender
,;X,.ttorney for Appellant
'
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